Our paper is the first systematic exploration of the leadership selection process in the Romanian party system. We use process-tracing and qualitative tools, employing data from party statutes and documents of the national conventions. We focus on the parliamentary political parties throughout the entire postcommunism period. The analysis shows that nothing has changed at the level of centralization of decision and inclusiveness with the members' involvement remaining marginal in all parties. The competitiveness of the internal elections presents a more diverse and dynamic picture. We propose a novel typology for cross-cases comparisons that illustrates the association between informal decentralization and increased competitiveness. Second, we advance explanations for the persistence of the 'exclusiveness' status quo, that take into account intra-organizational, institutional and exogenous factors.
Introduction
The fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) coincided with the (re)appearance of multi-party systems where independent actors had the chance to form elected governments. As first post-communist institutional actors, the political parties grew on the crude soil of no prior competition (Kitschelt 1992; Mair 1997) , lack of representation, and any democratic experience for half of century (Lewis 1996) .
Additionally, parties were confronted with adversarial popular attitudes, triggered by the equivalence in people's minds between 'party' and the communist state (Szczerbiak 2001; Millard 2004; Kopecky 2007) . These structural settings were initially complemented by two instrumental and procedural traits: the dominant control of the parliamentary party over leadership politics and the limited recruitment and involvement of party members (Lewis 2000; Mair and van Biezen 2001; Kopecky 2001; van Biezen 2003; Weldon 2006) . However, in most post-communist countries the status quo was partially changed by allowing citizens to participate more in the life of the parties. This happened either through the gradual prevalence of certain permeable organizational models such as in Bulgaria (Spirova 2005; , or through the appearance of new parties, more open to grassroots involvement such as 'Politics can be different' -LMP in Hungary (Batory 2010) .
In stark contrast with these developments, the Romanian parties display an uninterrupted oligarchic inertia. For two decades, there is little if any change with respect to the decision making process within political parties. Despite the increasing discontent of citizens with their elected leaders, constant low levels of party membership, and continuous success of anti-democratic forces, the political parties continue to have highly centralized leadership selection and removal mechanisms with reduced members' involvement. Moreover, while all the parliamentary parties have suffered at one moment or another in time major electoral defeats, they nevertheless resisted temptation to change significantly their organizations. The empirical puzzle resulting from this situation coincides with the research question driving our paper:
what causes the lack of reforms with respect to the leadership selection in the Romanian political parties?
In answering this question, we use process-tracing and qualitative tools, employing data from party statutes and documents of the national congresses. We focus on the parliamentary political parties throughout the entire post-communism period.
The analysis has two major goals: first, it describes the differences between political parties in terms of recruitment, ending up with a useful typology for cross-cases comparisons; second, we seek explanations for the persistence of the status quo at three interconnected levels -party organization, party system, and exogenous factors. Our results indicate that the absence of individual and collective challenges within the party, the structure of incentives for candidates, the charisma of the party presidents, the lack of real threats in the political arena (e.g. low number of entries and exits, the relatively low level of electoral volatility), and the components of the electoral system represent valid explanations for ignoring the intra-party reforms and for the dominance of the party in central office.
The CEE party systems are under-investigated from the perspective of the leadership selection. With the exception of a few analyses focusing on the system (Cular 2009; Rybar and Deegan Krause 2009) or on specific parties (Linek and Lyons 2009), there are no available descriptions of the norms and procedures of party leadership selection. The topic is marginally approached when discussing various components of party organizations. In this respect, Romania is not an outlier among the CEE countries.
It lacks a systematic account of the selection procedures both in longitudinal and crossparty perspectives. The few studies dealing with the party organization (Pop-Eleches 1999; Stefan 2004; Preda and Soare 2008; Gherghina 2009; Sum 2010; Matichescu and Protsyk 2011) focused more on the issues related to candidate selection and leadership control over party resources instead of exploring how those leaders gained access to power and how this process evolved over time. This paper fills this void with an analysis covering the most relevant political parties in Romania throughout the entire the post-communist period.
The first section includes the theoretical underpinning of our endeavor. The research design introduces the main indicators used in the paper briefly describes the five main Romanian parties under scrutiny. The third section analyzes the formal party regulations concerning leadership selection. Next, we present all the cases of leadership renewal or re-election, which are then analyzed with respect to inclusiveness and competitiveness. The last two sections ground the findings in the wider context of Romanian party politics pointing to both competing and complementary explanations.
Why Democratize the Leadership Selection?
Intra-party democracy is a broad and often unclear concept (Michels 1919; Wright 1971 ) that mainly describes a broad range of measures allowing the involvement of members in the internal deliberation of political parties (Scarrow 2005, 1) . In empirical terms, the internal democracy of political parties witnessed a gradual longitudinal evolution. The initial studies conducted on party organizations revealed a domination of the elites in reaching decisions and quasi-absence of any democratic mechanism (Ostrogorsky 1906; Michels 1911; Duverger 1954; Mackenzie 1956 ). Starting with the social changes occuring in the aftermath of World War II and the appearrence of the mass party (Duverger 1954) , the monopoly of elites in the decision making process gradually diminished and members started enjoying a loud voice. Consequently, the party regulations begun to formalize this growing influence of members (Gallagher et al. 2005 ) and thus reinforced notable organizational changes towards internal democratization (Bille 2001; Kittilson and Scarrow 2003) . On these grounds, members were provided decision power in two major processes of selection -of candidates (Pennings and Hazan 2001; Rahat and Hazan 2001) (Scarrow 2005) . Such developments contradict earlier assessments according to which democracy exists only between parties (Schattschneider 1942; Dahl 1956 ).
The consequences of members' involvement are ambivalent. On the one hand, the use of internally democratic procedures bears two connected advantages: they allow the selection of capable and appealing candidates/leaders and strengthen the democratic culture of the society (Scarrow 1999; . The latter reflects the impact on the electoral environment, being consistent with previous studies emphasizing the role of parties' strategies and internal organization on individual involvement in political life (Epstein 1967; Powell 1982) . On the other hand, emerging tensions between members and leaders can represent important obstacles to the modernization of the party organization (Panebianco 1988) or to the homogeneity of party manifestos, i.e. radical vs. moderate (May 1973) . Moving beyond these advantages and risks, the selection of leaders is of relevant importance for the life of the party. Whereas the candidate selection involves the choices political parties present to voters, the stake for the party leadership is considerably higher as whoever holds the control over the selection procedures controls the party (Schattschneider 1942) . Such a claim is even more relevant in the context of accumulated influence gained by the contemporary party leaders in the legislature, electorate, and own organizations (Bean and Mughan 1989; Wattenberg 1991; Mughan 1993; 2000; Farrell 1996; Davis 1998; Scarrow et al. 2000) .
Such central positions are captured by concepts such as personalization (Kaase 1994) or "presidentialization" (Poguntke and Webb 2005) of party politics.
The democratization of party leadership selection was prescribed as a cure for many contemporary democratic diseases. Its action was explored at three interconnected levels. First, it was expected "to reduce the parties' elitist and oligarchic tendencies by attracting more leadership aspirants and producing more competitive contests" (Kenig 2008: 240) . Second, this move was also thought to empower the parties' rank and file and generally make party membership more attractive (Harmel and Janda 1994) , thus creating opportunities for new recruitment (LeDuc 2001, 325) .
Such a measure can represent an effective alternative to the ideological and material incentives that gradually lost their ability to retain and attract members (Ignazi et al. 2005) . Third, more intra-party democracy and larger public exposure of it are perceived as one of the ways to fight democratic disengagement (Schmitter and Trechsel 2004) .
From an instrumental perspective, the extension of party selectorates was frequently associated with two mechanisms. On the one hand, it aimed to improve the image of the party in the eyes of the electorate and thus represented an electoral asset.
The democratization of leadership selection often occurred as an adaptation function of the party organization after electoral defeats (Mair et al. 2004) . The latter convinced party elites of the need for renewal (Deschouwer 1992; LeDuc 2001) and provided additional arguments to those in favor of more grassroots participation (Cross and Blais 2011) . In this respect, the reform of leadership selection was introduced to the public as a legitimizing process in the attempt to gain voters' confidence especially by the opposition parties (Cross 1996) . On the other hand, newly emerged parties seemed more likely to adopt inclusive leadership selection methods both in order to boost their brand image in the voters' eyes and because they lacked established party elites that would veto the move in order to conserve their influence (Gauja 2009; Cross and Blais 2011) . Empirically, it seems that this hypothesis works only for the new parties on the left (i.e., Green parties) which tend to have low boundary control and a broad organizational reach (Bolleyer 2008) . At the same time, elites can control the leadership selection by democratizing the entire process. Through the participation of individual members, elites diminish the power of activists and middle-rank members (Katz and Mair 1995) .
At a glance, CEE exhibits the general features that would, in principle, encourage parties to promote a democratic leadership selection. One reason is represented by the much lower levels of party membership compared to Western European countries (Lewis 1996; Bielasiak 1997; Kopecký 2001; Mair and van Biezen 2001; van Biezen 2003; Spirova 2007) . Low affiliation levels are mainly due to two related factors: the membership recruitment strategies and the refuse of citizens to enroll in political parties (Szczerbiak 2006, 115) . A second argument is related to the ideological confusion and weak programmatic identities among the competitors in most postcommunist elections (Kitschelt 1995; Millard 2004; Grzymala-Busse 2006) leading to a situation in which voters could hardly be expected to develop identification and attach loyalty towards parties (Mair 1997) . Moreover, previous research indicates high levels of electoral volatility throughout the entire post-communist period both in absolute values and relative to established democracies (Rose et al. 1998; Toka 1998; Krupavicius 1999; Lewis 2000; Birch 2001 , Sikk 2005 Tavits 2005 ).
However, three characteristics of political parties indicate that the existence of inclusive leadership selection is quite unlikely in CEE. First, in the absence of strong social cleavages (Rivera 1996) , political parties did not have societal roots, but rather institutional ( van Biezen 2003; Millard 2004) anchors, and they were formed following a top-down approach in which elites played the crucial role. Second, partially as a consequence of the initial origins and process of formation, the centralization of candidate selection is quite high across the region (Gherghina 2009a) . There are isolated instances in which political parties provide high autonomy to the territorial organizations in deciding the candidates for the national legislative elections. Only a handful of parties are formally inclusive, i.e. have drafted regulations for primaries, that in reality only half of these actors organize. Third, the extensive relationships developed by the CEE parties with the state (Kopecký 2006; van Biezen and Kopecký 2007; Kopecký 2008) and their clientelistic practices make difficult the democratization of leadership selection. The particular case of the Romanian political parties illustrates that wealth plays a crucial role in the candidate selection and list composition for both the national (Stefan 2004; Protsyk and Matichescu 2011) and European (Gherghina and Chiru 2010) elections. In this respect, the elites' interest to hold control of the selection procedures is not limited to candidates but covers also their own positions. This rationale indicates little if any reasons to increase the inclusiveness and/or decentralization in deciding about the leadership of the party.
This combination of contextual factors generates a puzzling situation in which benefits and risks of leadership selection intermingle. Our case study explores the situation of leadership selection in the Romanian party system departing from three dimensions emphasized by previous studies: inclusiveness, centralization (Rahat and Hazan 2001; LeDuc 2001) , and competitiveness of internal elections (Engstrom and Engstrom 2008; Kenig 2008) . Whereas previous studies are usually concerned with the type of reforms and the rationales behind them (Lisi 2009 ), there are extremely few attempts to explain the lack of reforms (Cross and Blais 2011) . The examination of formal and informal leadership selection on these three analytic dimensions provides relevant information about the reform and its obstacles.
Research Design
The five political parties investigated in this paper simultaneously fulfill three criteria that make them relevant actors on the domestic political scene. First, we avoided episodic political parties by selecting those competitors present in at least half of the post-communist Romanian legislatures. Second, we accounted for the appealing parties to the electorate by selecting parties competing in at least two elections on individual basis (e.g. without an electoral alliance or coalition). Finally, we targeted parties with coalition and blackmail potential (in the sense imagined by Sartori 1976) . The resulting pool includes the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), the National Liberal Party (PNL), the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), and the Greater Romania Party (PRM). Brief profiles of these parties are sketched in the following sub-section.
Although our outcome of interest is a negative one, i.e. non-reform of leadership selection, one should not straightforwardly reject the relevance of the five cases analyzed here for the understanding of democratization processes. Thus, if we apply the 'possibility principle' (Mahoney and Goertz 2004) one can reject only one case, that of PRM -as being totally irrelevant, given its high centralization, absolute lack of competitiveness in leadership selection, and gradual marginalization on the political scene. All the other four parties could have engaged in reform for distinct reasons that will be explained further on. between the winner and the candidate finishing second is motivated by the belief that in judging competitiveness a premium should be put on the measure of how close the race was, and implicitly for such a closed context, on the likelihood for the incumbent to lose (see also Janda et al. 2010 , for a similar emphasis -on the seat share of the second largest party for the quality of governance).
We use document analysis and process tracing to map the evolution of the leadership selection processes. Thus our data comprises official documents (mainly party statutes, but also official accounts of conventions) and secondary literature (chronologies, political analyses of leadership change etc.).
The Romanian Political Parties
The Social Democrats (PSD) is the largest Romanian party in the post-communist period.
It is one of the two successors of the Romanian Communist Party and the direct continuator of the Iliescu-wing of the National Salvation Front (FSN) -the neocommunist umbrella organization that took over the control of the country after 
The Regulations of Leadership Selection
This section summarizes the party regulations concerning the selection of leaders as mentioned in their official statutes (the most recent version). At the same time, we reveal the most important modifications brought to these rules during the entire postcommunist period. Table 1 includes the key components of the leadership selection procedures and provides an indication of the major similarities and differences between the Romanian parties. In terms of common procedures, all parties rely on territorial delegates (and thus no real variation with respect to inclusiveness) with representation quotas decided by the central leadership (usually on the basis of the branches' varying degrees of electoral success). One further formal provision observed at all political parties but PRM is the presence of ex-officio delegates. Regarding the differences, some parties such as PSD and PRM keep their regulations broad and include only general guidelines, whereas parties like UDMR and PNL exhibit clearer statutes. The latter refer to the explicit means of leader dismissal or the presentation of explicit criteria for the representation algorithm. UDMR has the most specific regulation among the Romanian parties including details on the mandates for youth members or delegates of corporate organizations. Given its profile as a conglomerate of platforms, the specificity of UDMR provisions is an expected outcome. In PSD, there is a requirement of minimum three years of membership in order for a politician to be able to run for a national party office. The President is elected through data (which is a recurrent problem for the first Congresses, but also for those lacking any real stake, as in the case of the PRM), it is still possible to observe a general trend for more inclusiveness. This trend is most visible for PSD and PNL and also for UDMR, although at a more reduced level in the latter case. The largest selectorate was registered without doubt at the 2005 PDL National Convention, which was nothing more than a "coronation", decided upon in advanced. The increased size of national conventions reflect a tendency of the parties to capitalize on the more and more amplified media coverage these events produce, especially after the appearance of private channels specialized in news. 5 With these occasions the party leaderships want to transmit a message of strength to the electorate -and they organize the conventions in immense halls (at the former House of the People or in large exhibition complexes such as Romexpo) that, of course, need to be filled with delegates.
From Coronations to Competition
In the light of the previous empirical argument according to which inclusiveness is not a variable in the leadership selection of the Romanian parties, this section focuses on their competitiveness and the centralization of decision making within parties. In this respect, we focus on the political contexts of leadership stability and change in each party, ending up with a typology that reflects rigidity in terms of centralization and relative flexibility with respect to the competitiveness. 4 In the interviews conducted by Gherghina (2009a) , PNL officials declared that they were not aware of the party's membership rates for the 1992-2000 period, since no central national register of members was maintained. 5 On the contrary, in the first post-communist decade, party congresses were much smaller events, and significantly fewer accounts of them appeared in the media.
A Centralized Selection Process
For five electoral cycles the Romanian parties operated under a closed proportional representation electoral system. 6 This institutional setting is believed to favor the centralization of candidate selection (Lundell 2004; Hazan and Voerman 2006) and generally, of decision making within parties (Blais and Massicotte 1996) . However, the effect of the systemic institutional framework was mediated by internal party regulations as well as by more contingent events: such as the appearance of asymmetric levels of autonomy enjoyed by certain branches due to their electoral success or overall contribution to the party budget. decentralized as the UDMR, PNL has allowed its local organizations to participate more in the decision making compared to the rest of the parties (Gherghina 2009a ). This decentralization may be the result of the numerous splits and mergers witnessed by PNL throughout the post-communist period. The increased powers of local and territorial organizations in nominating and selecting candidates partially diminish the shock generated by the numerous organizational changes decided at central level.
Unlike the previous three cases, PSD presents a rather surprising evolution: it transformed from a highly centralized organization dominated by its parliamentary elite in the early 1990s to a much looser structure starting with the third presence in power (2000) . This change can be attributed mainly to the preeminence that local bosses have gained in the party, mainly based on their electoral and financial domination of entire counties (Chiru 2010 ). Many of them -labeled 'local barons' by media -were elected for several mandates as presidents of county councils and were involved in corruption scandals triggered mainly by their clientelistic networks (România Curată 2008). Their influence in the party thus increased exponentially, especially due to their party financing and vote mobilization capabilities.
Finally, PDL -although recognized for most of its existence as a "party of mayors" -was dominated in terms of decision making by its parliamentary elite during the Roman leadership (Ștefan 2004) and later on by Băsescu and its close collaborators. The lack of alternative power centers in the party is reflected both by the legerity with which its central leadership could impose non-party members as candidates for eligible public positions or even newcomers for party offices, and by the lack of contestation which will make the subject of the next section.
The Evolution of Competitiveness
As the Constitution prohibited the country's president to be party leader at the same time, the party formed after the split with FSN, which was named firstly, Democratic did not take place until the present. To sum up, only one in one case (2001) did more candidates run to become the president of the party, and even in that occasion the contest was not too competitive -with Băsescu being seen from the start as the frontrunner and gathering in the end twice as many votes as the incumbent.
PNL is by far the parliamentary party with most changes in leadership since 1990: not less than six. Only one leader, Mircea Ionescu Quintus managed to win a second mandate (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . But the first president of the Alliance was the writer Domokos Géza (1990 Géza ( -1991 Géza ( , 1991 Géza ( -1993 . At the first Congress of the Alliance, held in April 1990 Domokos Géza did not have a counter-candidate (Bogdán 2011) . However, one year later -in late The Popular Greater Romania Party (PPRM). These spectacular changes happened at the decision of C.V. Tudor, who made a step behind, to become only the honorary president of the party (Jurnalul 2005b) . Tudor hoped that in this way the party's application for membership in the European Popular Party would be accepted. Only three months later, in June 2005 another plenary session of the National Council reversed both changes, and C.V. Tudor was once again the president of PRM. Moreover, the ex-president, Ciontu and another MP were excluded from the party (Jurnalul 2005c) . Table 3 summarizes the competition of every leadership selection process.
Whenever it was more than one candidate, we use the difference between the first and second competitor explained in the research design section. Overall, PNL appears to be the most competitive Romanian party -in spite of some missing data -with the least elections in which a single candidate was involved. The following two parties in terms of competitiveness are separated by a small difference and display contrasting trends of the number of candidates. On the one hand, UDMR has competitive elections almost from the beginning -an exception is the first congress -and this competition is limited More than half of the leadership selections (19 out of 34) were actually, "coronations", i.e., races with only one contender (Kenig 2008: 245) . Accordingly, the incumbent 9 For all the parties, but more important for the UDMR, the congresses exposed in the table are only those conventions that elected leaders. 10 The average is calculated by considering the instances where a single candidate contested as no competition and thus received a score of 100. High values of the average indicate low competitivity in elections. 11 For the incumbency success rate were taken into account only those cases were the incumbent participated in elections. This does not bias our indicator as in the Romanian parties it is more frequently for a president that steps down to ensure the election of a favorite (two cases in PSD and PNL, and one in PDL, UDMR and PRM) than for a leader to resign because he knows that he will be defeated in the next elections.
success rates are quite high -above 75% in all parties. This rate is somewhat misleading as it puts on a par the elections in UDMR and those in PRM. The former was characterized by open contestation of the incumbent and more changes of leader compared to the centralized PRM. The positioning of PNL at the other extreme in terms of the incumbent's success is logically consistent with the previous findings according to which the party was the most competitive. The surprising finding is related to the relatively low success of incumbents in PSD where competition was opened only a few years ago. In two out of three elections with more than one candidate the challenger won in tight competitions.
The Lack of Reform in Leadership Selection
On the basis of these findings, table 4 includes the typology created on the dimensions of centralization of decision making (referred as autonomy of the territorial organizations of the party) and the competitiveness. The coding of the former reflects both the party statutes and the informal evolutions previously described. High competitiveness is any difference smaller than 30%, whereas everything above that threshold enters into the low competitiveness category. With one exception, the 2006 Congress of PSD (table 3) , the following score is around the value of 50%. Thus, the discrepancy between the two categories is quite high with no cases situated at the category boundary; the cut-off point does not influence the positioning of the cases in the cells of the typology. (1992 ( ) PDL (1992 ( -2000 PRM (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) PSD (2006) PNL (1993 PNL ( , 1997 PNL ( , 2002 PNL ( , 2005 PNL ( , 2010 ) UDMR (2003, 2007, 2011) 
High Competitiveness
PDL (2001) PSD ) PNL (2001 ) UDMR (1991 At a glance, two general observations are visible. First, most cases are located in the cell corresponding to low competitiveness and low autonomy of the territorial branches.
These situations imply that quite often there is a single candidate and the decision to select him (there is no female leader in any Romanian party under scrutiny) is usually concentrated in the hands of the centre through increased decision with respect to the quota of territorial representatives. Second, the dynamic is only visible with respect to the competitiveness dimension: the number of candidates and the stake of elections increase at various times. However, the high rates of incumbent success (table 3) indicate that this is only a formal openness and most of the times the challengers have little if any chance in winning. With two exceptions (PSD starting 2005) , there is no shift in the degree of centralization. Political parties continue to select leaders using the same procedures for two decades. Why does nothing change?
One of the main explanations is related to the relatively high degree of personalization of the Romanian politics. Without strong programmatic orientation, some of the Romanian parties have sought to command the allegiance of voters through the charismatic appeal of their leaders -PRM and PDL being the prime examples here.
In exchange, as long as their popularity drove the party support, the leaders 'represented and hierarchically guided a collective of followers', and were allowed to 'circumvent organizational boundary controls whenever needed' (Bolleyer, 2008: 16) . 
The Absence of Bottom-Up Pressures
An additional crucial explanation of the problematic democratization refers to the lack of pressure from bellow. Most of the members of the Romanian parties rarely pay their membership fees and participate only seldom to the activities of their branches.
Conversely, the local and regional party leaders declare inflated rates of membership, so as to gain leverage in the higher decision-making organisms of party and they even pay some of these fictitious members' fees (Ghinea 2011) . At the same time, these leaders have a strong control over their branches and no real interest for larger participation neither in the daily life of the party, nor in its internal elections.
On the other hand, the democratization of legislative recruitment and leadership selection was thought to contribute to 'the leader autonomy feature' of cartel parties as Second, there was a progressive increase in the degree of electoral support that a nonparliamentary party needs to achieve in order to receive state subsidies. As a result no extra parliamentary party qualified for public funding after the 2000 and 2004 elections (Gherghina et al. 2011) . Third, at the turn of the millennium, the electoral threshold was increased (from 3%) to 5% for individual parties and 8-10% for alliances. Consequently, the intra-party dynamics appear to be predominantly a function of adaptation to exogenous factors.
With the exception of inclusiveness that is strikingly similar, there are relevant differences between the Romanian parties in terms of centralization of decision-making and competitiveness. Our typology identifies two main clusters of parties. On the one hand, the radical-right PRM and the two successor parties (PDL and PSD for most of its existence) display rigid selection mechanisms in which the territorial organizations do not play an active role and there is always a certain winner, known beforehand.
Unsurprisingly, these are the parties with most coronations in the entire party system.
On the other hand, the liberal and the ethnic parties and PSD since 2005 are
characterized by more open selection procedures in which the territorial branches have a say and competitions are not only symbolic. In the cases of PNL and UDMR, their organizational structure and development justifies such a behavior: PNL is the party with the most numerous splits and mergers among the Romanian parties, whereas UDMR acts like an umbrella entity incorporating a variety of local and territorial organizations and foundations.
The main theoretical implications of these findings are the existence of specific axes of leadership selection and the limited transformation of intra-party democracy around the competition dimension. The inclusiveness -used in many typologies and previous studies -is replaced in the Romanian case by competitiveness. In fact, this is the only dimension with longitudinal variation within parties and thus becomes the pillar of leadership selection democratization. Such a situation occurs in the presence of rarely modified centralization of decision. Although our analysis is conducted on a single case study, the same features can be observed in numerous political parties in CEE.
These observations have two contrasting empirical implications. On the one hand, the lack of reforms towards increased involvement of members in the decision making (inclusiveness and decentralization) makes difficult the promotion of new leaders. The absence of bottom-up pressures combined with a personalization of politics (strengthened by charismatic leaders) perpetuates such practices. By controlling the selection process, the elites keep the doors closed to challengers that might bring new ideas. Moreover, the presence of new leaders could modify the adaptation potential that is currently limited with respect to electoral failures. In this context, the intra-party competition often brings to the fore the same people that compete for official positions.
On the other hand, this rigidity can be directly linked to the limited entries and exits from the Romanian political scene and the stability of inter-party competition patterns.
The low rates of dramatic alternations of leaders help increasing the homogeneity of the party in the eyes of the voters. Thus, new actors face a psychological barrier in getting access to Parliament and the existing actors rely on a minimal core of voters that usually ensures their survival on the political scene.
Further studies might complement the findings revealed by the present analysis with qualitative data that would ideally capture the opinions of party leaders, mid-level activists and rank and file members with respect to the inclusiveness and competitiveness of leadership selection. One could then judge if the party socialization has made actors internalize continuity and leadership stability as core organizational values, or inversely, whether this static picture only conceals accumulated intense dissatisfaction which could fuel dramatic bottom-up changes in the near future.
